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Abstract—Recurrent Neural Networks (RNNs) have been
shown to be valuable for constructing Intrusion Detection Sys-
tems (IDSs) for network data. They allow determining if a
flow is malicious or not already before it is over, making it
possible to take action immediately. However, considering the
large number of packets that have to be inspected, the question
of computational efficiency arises. We show that by using a novel
Reinforcement Learning (RL)-based approach called SparseIDS,
we can reduce the number of consumed packets by more than
three fourths while keeping classification accuracy high. Compar-
ing to various other sampling techniques, SparseIDS consistently
achieves higher classification accuracy by learning to sample only
relevant packets. A major novelty of our RL-based approach is
that it can not only skip up to a predefined maximum number
of samples like other approaches proposed in the domain of
Natural Language Processing but can even skip arbitrarily many
packets in one step. This enables saving even more computational
resources for long sequences. Inspecting SparseIDS’s behavior
of choosing packets shows that it adopts different sampling
strategies for different attack types and network flows. Finally we
build an automatic steering mechanism that can guide SparseIDS
in deployment to achieve a desired level of sparsity.
I. INTRODUCTION
As the need for security mechanisms in today’s infrastruc-
ture’s communication networks grows, a substantial body of
scientific work focuses on developing reliable and explainable
frameworks for the identification of unwanted behavior. In the
past, a viable way to detect intrusions was to analyze the
contents of the packets themselves and determine, for example,
whether a packet contains potentially harmful content by
matching patterns. More recently, with the increasing deploy-
ment of encryption, the focus is now on features available
for network monitoring devices even if packets are encrypted,
such as packet sizes and temporal behavior. In our work
we concentrate on features available when encrypting above
transport layer (like for example TLS or QUIC), i.e. we also
include port numbers and protocol flags.
Network communication is typically aggregated into flows,
which are commonly defined as a sequence of packets that
share certain properties. When analyzing flows, not only
the aforementioned features are available but also features
representing the temporal behavior of the individual packets.
Various approaches have been proposed to extract flow fea-
tures with which anomaly detection can be performed: Authors
in [1] compare such approaches and show their efficacy. While
these approaches often work well, a major drawback is that
the whole flow must be received first and only then anomaly
detection can be applied, to reveal malicious flows. Thus, we
design a network IDS that operates on a per-packet basis
and determines whether a packet is anomalous based on the
aforementioned features. In this way, an RNN-based IDS has
the benefit of avoiding feature engineering procedures and let
the classifier build high level features by itself. [2] show that
such an architecture has similar performance to traditional
flow-based anomaly detection systems, but can still detect
anomalies before the flow ends. Furthermore they analyzed
its robustness with respect to adversaries extensively.
Nevertheless, not only the accuracy and reliability of clas-
sification, but also the computational efficiency, are critical
for practical use. This follows from the fact that a rationally-
acting organization will only implement an IDS if the cost
saved by preventing security breaches is higher than the cost
of the IDS itself. The cost of an IDS can be divided into (a)
the cost of purchase/installation, (b) the cost of operation and
(c) the cost of maintenance. The goal we pursue here is to
develop optimal sampling strategies that do not significantly
degrade classification performance while being able to only
process a small fraction of the original data. Specifically, a
good sampling technique should:
1) choose optimally, taking only samples that contain the
most information and skip the less relevant ones.
2) have a parameter that allows to trade off classification
performance for sparsity (choosing fewer packets).
3) be independent of the classifier so that any classifier can
be used and that the classifier doesn’t have to be aware
of the sampling strategy.
4) be retrainable so that the sampling can be continuously
adapted depending on the current threat landscape.
5) be able to skip arbitrarily many packets since network
flows can be very long but only the first couple of packets
are needed to decide whether an attack occurred or not.
6) be lightweight, so that computation efficiency is not
lower because of the sampling overhead.
For this purpose we develop the RL-based IDS SparseIDS
that fulfills the above properties. We show that a significant
number of packets can be skipped while the accuracy does
not drop considerably. Compared to other common sampling
techniques, SparseIDS performs better when being trained on
the same number of flows.
The accuracy-sparsity tradeoff of SparseIDS can be reg-
ulated by a reinforcement learning parameter that directly
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affects both quantities. However, as in some deployments,
a certain sparsity has to be minimally achieved to limit the
computational expense, we also develop a steering system that
adapts the tradeoff parameter in a closed control loop. In this
way the given budget of computation power is not exceeded.
To make SparseIDS as lightweight as possible, our im-
plementation allows to let the sampling and the classifier to
be implemented in the same neural network, meaning that
no overhead is introduced. Without this option enabled, the
computational power required is 2× what would be required
without the sampling. Thus, for this option, less than 50% of
packets must be sampled to gain a computational efficiency
advantage.
To encourage reproducibility and facilitate experimentation,
we publicly release the source code, the trained ML models,
the data and the figures of this work1.
II. RELATED WORK
Sampling of network packets to minimize computational
effort has been extensively studied. In [3], authors have
developed a scheme that varies the sampling rate depending
on the available resources, making the sampling framework
more effective than conventional fixed-rate sampling. In view
of the numerous sampling techniques that exist, the authors
in [4] published an overview of common methods for packet
sampling in IP networks.
As far as sampling for IDSs is concerned, several ap-
proaches have been proposed to sample packets retaining high
detection performance. Authors in [5] propose to single out
large flows for IDS and sample fewer packets for increased
computational efficiency. In [6] an approach based on Markov
chains to sample packets for IDS was used. [7] lay out a game-
theoretic model for determining which network paths are more
vulnerable and require more packet sampling and [8] develop a
system for Software Defined Networks, which aims to sample
more packets from more vulnerable parts of the network.
Considering recurrent approaches for network traffic, RNN-
based IDSs have been shown to perform very well. In [2],
authors build an LSTM-based recurrent classifier for Network
Intrusion Detection and further develop explainability meth-
ods as well as methods for security assessment of recurrent
classifiers.
Regarding skipping parts of sequences for RNNs, some
works investigated ways to let RNNs skip parts of sequences.
The focus of these works was mostly Natural Language
Processing and we know of no work that focuses on network
traffic. The following papers provide an overview of this
research domain:
Authors in [9] propose the usage of RL to make an LSTM
network learn to skim text. Their technique does not aim to
maximize sparsity but only lets the RL optimize classification
performance for the sequence as a whole. Thus, if it learns to
skip elements it is only because it is better for achieving good
1https://github.com/CN-TU/adversarial-recurrent-ids/tree/rl
classification performance, not because it wants to increase
sparsity.
Another technique developed in [10] includes a skip gate
into LSTM and other recurrent cells. It works without RL but
on the downside, their method can only be trained once and
not be adapted afterwards and also it explicitly depends on the
the implementation of the underlying classifier, while we want
a solution in which the sampling procedure and the classifier
are independent.
An LSTM network with two state vectors (one full state
vector and one reduced one) was used in [11]. At each step
the network decides whether to use the reduced or the full state
vector and can reduce computational cost by using the reduced
one. For network traffic it is often not even necessary to have
a reduced state vector since for some attack flows, already
the first couple of packets might contain enough information
and then the remaining packets of the flow do not have to be
considered anymore at all [2].
[12] use RL but their intention is not to skip samples but
instead to make the RL learn to choose a previous state that
can aid at the current step. Thus it tries to help the RNN with
memorizing information from the past but does not actually
take less data, which is the goal we pursue in this work.
These proposed techniques focus their evaluation on text
and hence do not fulfill all criteria we set out in section I.
Furthermore, all techniques that use RL use discrete actions,
meaning that there is a hyperparameter k, which influences
the maximum jump that is possible. However, for a network
flow, already after the second packet it might be obvious that
a flow is an attack and thus the remaining packets can be
completely ignored. It is therefore beneficial not to have a
fixed maximum step size but a continuous one. This allows
skipping arbitrarily many packets and gives more flexibility to
the sampling framework.
III. SPARSEIDS
To fulfill the goals outlined in section I, in this section we
propose the architecture of our proposed sampling framework
SparseIDS.
A. Classifier
We implemented a three-layer LSTM-based classifier with
128 neurons at each layer. We choose 128 neurons as we don’t
notice a significant degradation of performance compared to
the results of [2] (check Table II, flow accuracy) and as fewer
neurons allowed for more agility during the training phase and
allowed us to run more experiments. As the input features we
use source port, destination port, protocol identifier, packet
length, Interarrival time (IAT) to the previous packet in the
flow, packet direction (i.e. forward or reverse path) and all
TCP flags (0 if the flow is not TCP). We omitted Time-to-
Live (TTL) values, as they are likely to lead to unwanted
prediction behaviour [13]. Among the used features, source
port, destination port and protocol identifier are constant over
the whole flow while the others vary. Additionally, we add the
number of skipped packets since the last packet as a feature,
which can help the classifier because otherwise it might be
confused because of missing packets. We used the usual 5-
tuple flow key, which distinguishes flows based on the protocol
they use and their source and destination port and IP address.
B. Reinforcement Learning-based Sampling
Given enough training instances, RL algorithms have been
shown to perform very well in complex decision-making situ-
ations such as playing video games [14] as well as networking
problems such as congestion control [15]. We thus consider
an RL-based architecture to be suitable for taking packet
sampling decisions. The system should look at the current
packet as well as the history of the conversation flow and
output how many packets should be skipped until the next
packet is considered in the current flow. The reward that the
RL tries to maximize should be a combination of classification
accuracy and the number of packets that could be skipped
(sparsity). An operator should be able to specify how much
accuracy is allowed to be traded off for achieving higher
sparsity.
For a flow of length N at each packet n we have two reward
metrics which we compute in a fashion that is known from
R-learning [16]:
The classification reward metric (Equation 1) captures how
correct the classifier is on average for all future packets of a
flow. The label of each packet in a flow has a value of 0 for
non-attack traffic and 1 for attack traffic with one flow being
only attack or non-attack but not mixed. The confidence is the
sigmoided
(
ex
1+ex
)
output of the classifier, yielding a value
between 0 and 1, where 0 is absolute confidence for a flow
being benign and 1 is absolute confidence for a flow being an
attack.
Rclassification,n =
1
N − n
N∑
i=n+1
|1− (labeli − confidencei) |
(1)
Intuitively, the classification reward makes sure that packets
are chosen that contain the most information and thus result
in the highest classification performance.
The sparsity reward metric (Equation 2) captures how much
sparsity is achieved on average for all future packets of a
flow. E.g. for a flow of length 10 if after 5 packets have been
processed, 3 packets are chosen and 2 are skipped from the
remaining 5 packets, the sparsity reward metric at packet 5 is
2
10−(4+1) =
2
5 .
Rsparsity,n =
∑N
i=n+1 1skipped,i
N − (n+ 1) (2)
Figure 1 shows how classification and sparsity rewards are
computed for a toy example.
We opt for an Actor-Critic (AC) approach (as shown in
Figure 3) modeled after [17] because we consider it being
more interpretable than a Deep RL approach based on a Deep
Q Network like [14], as it outputs the reward that was expected
and the reward that was actually achieved, which we explain
in more detail in the next paragraphs.
Our proposed framework (see Figure 2) consists of three
independent neural networks: the classifier, the critic and the
actor.
The classifier’s goal is to guess correctly if a flow is an
attack or not. For this, it outputs its confidence for non-
attack/attack after reading a packet. As stated in subsec-
tion III-A, we choose an LSTM-based supervised classifier
for this work, but our framework can work together with
any classifier as long as it outputs a confidence for non-
attack/attack at each packet and can handle skipped packets.
For instance, it would also be possible to replace the LSTM
with an unsupervised autoencoder akin to [18].
The critic aims to estimate the future expected average
classification performance and the future expected average
sparsity that can be achieved at a packet n. For this, given
the current input vector and the state of the LSTM cells sn
and the neural network weights of the critic θv , it outputs the
value functions vclassification,n and vsparsity,n at each packet n.
It aims to predict the classification performance and sparsity
correctly for each packet by minimizing the following loss
function:
lv,n =(Rclassification,n − vclassification,n (sn; θc))2
+(Rsparsity,n − vsparsity,n (sn; θc))2
(3)
Now that the reward metrics and the critic’s outputs are
defined, we can define the overall utility U that we want to
maximize at each packet n as follows:
Un =(Rclassification,n + α ·Rsparsity,n)
− (vclassification,n + α · vsparsity,n)
(4)
With α being the sparsity-accuracy tradeoff parameter. This
means that we want the reward to be higher than the critic’s
expectation. Note that it would be also possible to unify both
reward metrics in one and have the critic have only one output,
but we consider it to be more interpretable to have two separate
outputs, which can be inspected by an operator.
The actor outputs a probability distribution at packet n,
which is sampled to determine the number of packets that
should be skipped next. It aims to change the distribution
so that actions which result in a higher reward are chosen
more frequently, maximizing the utility function. However,
this strategy could lead to the actor getting stuck with what
it considers the best decision and never try alternatives even
though they might result in a higher reward. This would be
equivalent to the actor being stuck in a local maximum. Thus,
the actor not only tries to change the distribution so that the
actions become more optimal (higher reward) but at the same
time also aims to maximize the entropy of the distribution so
that alternative choices are still explored reasonably often.
Specifically, at packet n of a network flow, given the current
state sn (which consists of the current input as well as the
LSTM state) and the neural network weights of the actor θa,
the actor outputs a probability distribution pi (an | sn; θa) from
which the action an ≥ 1 is sampled. an = 1 means that the
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Fig. 1: The computation of the rewards for a sample malicious flow: Gray packets (0) are skipped while black ones (1) are
chosen. “#Skipped/#Total” (number of packets skipped with respect to the total number of packets both starting from the
current position) and “Confidence” are the underlying parameters for rewards calculations (see Equation 1 and Equation 2).
Numbers are rounded to two digits after the decimal point.
next packet is inspected next, while, for example, an = 2
means that one packet is skipped until the next that is chosen,
an = 3 means that two are skipped and so forth. Besides
wanting to make actions which result in a high reward more
likely, the actor also seeks to optimize the entropy H(·) of the
probability distribution so that it keeps exploring and doesn’t
get stuck with a suboptimal policy.
Combining these objectives, the actor network aims to
minimize the loss function
la,n =− log (pi (an | sn; θa))Un︸ ︷︷ ︸
Policy Loss
− β H (pi (sn; θa))︸ ︷︷ ︸
Entropy
(5)
In related work regarding RL-based sampling for sequences,
only discrete actions were evaluated so far: The actor would
output a categorical probability distribution with a fixed max-
imum number of bins k. A drawback of this approach is
that only a predefined maximum number of packets can be
skipped at once (the maximum of the actions space) and that
for a very large number of k, it can take a long time to
converge to an optimum policy as there are k different options
to explore at each packet n. Besides discrete actions, we thus
also experiment with continuous actions, which allow to skip
arbitrarily many packets.
C. Continuous Actions
For performing continuous actions we need a probability
distribution which can be parametrized to have the mean
between 0 and positive infinity. Furthermore it must have at
least two parameters so that the standard deviation, which
is required for the entropy (Equation 5), can be changed
independently of the mean. For example, the Exponential
distribution can be parametrized to have its mean anywhere
between 0 and positive infinity, however, it has only one
parameter and thus the mean and the standard deviation cannot
be independently changed. Conversely, a simple distribution
which fits our requirements is the log-normal distribution,
which is defined as a normal distribution whose output is
exponentiated.
The architecture in Figure 2 shows that the actor network
has two outputs: µ and σ. These encode the mean and standard
deviation of a log-normal distribution and can never be smaller
or equal to zero and hence we always apply a rectifier function
at the output. We choose the softplus, which is a smooth
rectifier function:
softplus(x) = log (1 + ex) (6)
When sampling from the log-normal distribution, a real
number is obtained. We round it down and then add 1. This
gives us a natural number between 1 and∞, which states how
many packets should be skipped.
When experimenting with continuous actions, we encoun-
tered one practical problem: At the beginning of training,
the classifier would still perform badly and would not give
the actor a useful reward. As a result, the actor would only
focus on sparsity and aim to maximize it, as the classification
reward would always be equally bad no matter how many
packets are chosen. Thus, the actor would learn to let µ go
to infinity. This would increase the reward at the beginning
when the interaction between the three components of our
RL system is still fragile. As a solution, we add a penalty to
the reward calculation when the actor jumps far behind the
last flow packet. The modified reward applies only to the last
chosen packet and penalizes the actor jumping more than one
packet behind the last packet. The sparsity reward formula
(Equation 2) of the last packet is modified as follows, where
last refers to the index of the last chosen packet in the flow
(n = last):
Rsparsity,last =
(∑N
i=last+1 1skipped,i
)
N − (last + 1 + (last + alast −N − 1))
(7)
Specifically, it adds the term (last + alast −N − 1) to the
denominator which penalizes the actor jumping more than one
packet behind the flow. Jumping just right after the flow does
not get penalized because if the actor considers the rest of the
flow as irrelevant, ignoring the rest of the flow and jumping
to the first packet behind the flow is a useful action.
Actor network
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Linear µ (1)
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Fig. 2: An overview of the complete neural network being
used in our experiments. Ocher stands for the input, blue for
linear layers, red for LSTM layers and purple for the outputs
of the neural network. The numbers in parentheses next to
each label stand for the width of that layer (i.e. the number
of neurons (except for the inputs and outputs)). Parts of the
neural network are shared between vclassification and vsparsity as
well as µ and σ as they output quantities of similar magnitude
and thus the gradients that are computed when updating the
neural network are of the same order of magnitude as well.
Our implementation also supports sharing the LSTM between
all three neural network. However, as the five outputs can
have different orders of magnitude, larger gradients would
“overwrite” the gradients of the smaller ones.
IV. OTHER SAMPLING TECHNIQUES
In order to evaluate the performance of SparseIDS, we
compare it with a few straightforward sampling techniques. We
opt for three sampling families that, unlike SparseIDS cannot
adapt their strategy based on packet contents.
A. Random Sampling
Given the fraction p of packets to be selected in a sequence
of N packets, this technique will sample each individual
packet with probability of p. Theoretically, if the sequence
is large enough (infinitely large), m packets will be randomly
sampled from a uniform distribution whereby m ≈ N × p.
Naturally, the number of chosen packets can vary to some
degree. This variation is larger for short flows. In practice,
random sampling works well if several packets have similar
properties (redundancy) and therefore the probability of skip-
ping important information is minimal.
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Fig. 3: SparseIDS framework. Three deep networks are shown:
the LSTM classifier, the actor network and the critic network.
The actor takes actions based on the feedback from the the
critic network and the classifier. The critic network tracks the
actor’s actions based on the classifier confidence and finally,
the packets selector parses packets based on the decision of
the actor network.
B. Relative First m Packets
As its name suggests, this technique only samples the first
packets from each flow and ignores the rest of the flow. For
a sampling rate p it will take the first m packets from each
flow so that m ≈ N × p. For example, for a flow with length
10 and p = 0.2, it will take the first 2 packets, for another
flow of length 40 and for the same sampling rate (p = 0.2), it
will sample the first 8 packets. For this procedure the length
of a flow has to be known beforehand and thus it is not
applicable in a streaming scenario. This technique is successful
under the assumption that most information for determining
maliciousness is present in the first few packets of a flow,
i.e. a large data transfer in which the initial packets represent
a hand-shake after which the majority of packets contain the
raw data and do not reveal significant information to non-Deep
Packet Inspection (DPI) systems.
C. First m Packets
This technique is similar to the one above, with the dif-
ference that the length of a flow doesn’t have to be known
beforehand. If flows have an average length of 10 packets, and
the sampling rate p = 0.2 it would take up to two packets from
each flow regardless of its length. To determine the average
length of flows, it is necessary to use experience from past
flows.
D. Every ith Sampling
Finally, we use a periodic sampling technique that, for
a sampling rate p, takes a sample each i ≈ 1p packets.
Similar to the last technique, the length of the flow is not
needed in this case. In practice, this technique is best suited
to keep the distribution of the sampled set similar to the
original distribution, and it is thus suited for scenarios where
information is heterogeneously distributed between packets
over an entire network flow.
In each of the above techniques, the first packet of each flow
is always taken because otherwise one could get undefined
behavior: If a flow only consists of 1 packet and this packet
is not chosen, it is not even defined if the prediction of
the classifier was correct for this flow or not. Thus, in our
implementations of the above sampling techniques, we make
sure that even when the first packet is always chosen, the
overall fraction of chosen packets corresponds to the sampling
probability p.
After applying the sampling techniques, the sequence of
selected packets is then fed to the classifier discussed in
subsection III-A, where features are extracted and a decision
is made after each packet. Also, the classifier gets information
on how many packets were skipped prior to each packet.
V. DATASET
TABLE I: Occurrence frequency of the attack flows of CIC-
IDS-2017.
Attack type Proportion
DoS Hulk 10.10%
PortScan, Firewall 6.90%
DDoS LOIT 4.08%
Infiltration 3.30%
DoS GoldenEye 0.32%
DoS SlowHTTPTest 0.18%
DoS Slowloris 0.17%
Brute-force SSH 0.11%
Botnet ARES 0.03%
XSS attack 0.03%
PortScan, no Fw. 0.02%
Brute-force FTP 0.01%
SQL injection <0.01%
Heartbleed <0.01%
For our experiments, we use the CIC-IDS-2017 [19] dataset,
which includes more than 2 million flows of network data,
containing both benign traffic and a large number of different
attacks. The distribution of different attacks in the dataset are
shown in Table I.
We use Z-score normalization and a train/test split of 2:1.
To speed up experimentation, we cut flows at a maximum
length of 20. As Figure 5d shows, there are only few flows
that exceed that length.
VI. RESULTS
We study the effect of the sparsity-accuracy tradeoff first,
then we evaluate both discrete and continuous actions and,
finally, we compare our results with other sampling techniques.
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Fig. 4: Training with a tradeoff of 0.1 with continuous actions.
Training accuracy increases sharply in the beginning while
increasing more slowly later on. The behavior for sparsity is
similar. As the classifier gets better, the RL starts skipping
more packets.
Overall, sampling based on RL reveals that a high number
of packets can be skipped while maintaining good accuracy.
Then, we inspect how the RL chooses packets and show that
certain patterns can be spotted.
For all our experiments we train our neural networks for 8
epochs (> 10 million flows) with the Adam optimizer with a
learning rate of 0.001. An important implementation detail is
that we always start with the first packet of a flow, meaning
that it cannot be skipped. Also, we set the entropy parameter to
0.01. Figure 4 shows how, during training, accuracy increases
quickly at the beginning and then gradually afterwards. At the
same time, sparsity gets higher as the RL learns which packets
can be skipped since they do not influence classification
performance.
Opposed to the behavior during training, we do not ran-
domly sample from the probability distribution of the actor
during deployment. We instead take the mean of the distri-
bution for the continuous case and the mode for the discrete
one. This is reasonable and best practice [17] since during
deployment we do not aim to explore the possible choices
anymore as they were already learned during training: Only the
optimal choice, which was learned, should be applied and no
exploration is necessary since the actor does not train anymore.
Furthermore, the critic is only necessary during training for the
reward of the actor. During deployment, it can be disabled,
saving computational power.
A. Influence of the tradeoff
Table II shows the influence of the tradeoff parameter α. For
columns with a tradeoff of 0.0, we train the classifier regularly
with all packets without using RL. For tradeoffs 0.1, 0.5 and
1.0 we train SparseIDS using RL with continuous actions and
keep the tradeoff constant for the whole training. Results show
that the higher the tradeoff, the fewer packets are sampled and
the lower the accuracy.
TABLE II: Comparing classification metrics per flow with
different tradeoffs. The higher the tradeoff, the higher the
sparsity but also the lower the accuracy.
Tradeoff 0.0 0.1 0.5 1.0
Sparsity 0% 76.3% 76.5% 76.8%
Accuracy 99.5% 99.4% 99.3% 99.0%
Precision 99.4% 98.5% 98.7% 97.9%
Recall 98.5% 99.0% 98.6% 98.1%
F1 99.0% 98.7% 98.6% 98.0%
Youden 98.4% 98.5% 98.2% 97.4%
TABLE III: Comparing classification metrics per flow between
RL-based sampling with continuous actions (tradeoff 0.1) and
alternative strategies.
RL random every ith relative first m first m
Sparsity 76.3% 76.3% 76.3% 76.3% 76.3%
Accuracy 99.4% 96.9% 97.8% 97.3% 98.3%
Precision 98.5% 92.4% 95.8% 93.8% 95.6%
Recall 99.0% 95.6% 95.4% 95.5% 97.9%
F1 99.7% 94.0% 95.6% 94.7% 96.7%
Youden 98.5% 93.0% 93.9% 93.4% 96.4%
B. Discrete vs. Continuous actions
Table IV compares continuous and discrete (20 different)
actions and shows that continuous actions result in a higher
accuracy with fewer samples being selected. This leads to
the conclusion that at least for our use case and for the
dataset we consider, continuous actions seem to perform
better. Generally, the advantage of discrete actions is that
they are theoretically more powerful as they can compare
each of the possible actions with each other, while the only
possibility for continuous actions is to increase or decrease
the mean of the log-normal distribution, which can lead to
worse performance. On the other hand, with discrete actions,
the maximum number of samples to skip is fixed, which we
consider to be a major drawback. Furthermore, training time
is potentially higher since, for example, for a discrete action
space of 20 actions, each option is treated as being completely
different and, while actually there is not a large difference
between skipping 18 or 19 packets, there is a big difference
between skipping 0 packets compared to skipping 19 packets.
This means that for discrete actions, all actions are perceived
as being completely independent, which is not true as the
reward function considers sparsity, which increases gradually
as more packets are skipped and thus similar actions result in
similar rewards.
C. Comparing with other sampling methods
Next we compared the RL technique used by SparseIDS
with several common sampling strategies suggested in sec-
tion IV. Table III reveals that SparseIDS achieves the highest
accuracy with the same sparsity. Not surprisingly, random
sampling performs the worst, as it is likely that a flow is
“unfortunate” and doesn’t get enough packets sampled while
TABLE IV: Comparing classification metrics per flow with
either discrete (20 different actions) or continuous actions. The
tradeoff is always 0.1.
Actions continuous discrete
Sparsity 76.3% 73.6%
Accuracy 99.4% 99.2%
Precision 98.5% 98.7%
Recall 99.0% 98.3%
F1 99.7% 98.5%
Youden 98.5% 97.8%
another one gets more packets or the packets that carry
more useful information. The best strategy besides the RL
approach seems to be “first m” sampling, which matches the
conclusion from [2] that the first couple of packets are the
most important ones for determining maliciousness of a flow.
“first m” performs better than “relative first m” because for
“relative first m”, longer flows will have more packets sampled
from them. Conversely, very short flows will get few packets.
For example, with p = 0.2, a flow of length 20 will get 4
packets while one with 4 packets will get only 1. However,
with ‘first m”, the short and the long flow will get the same
number of packets. Apparently it is better if all flows get the
same number of packets than if long flows get more packets.
D. Inspecting the RL’s behavior
Figure 5 shows the sampling strategy for different attack
types. Figure 5a shows that for benign traffic, the sampling
strategy is quite heterogeneous: Not specific packets get al-
ways chosen, but different packets get chosen, depending on
the flow. This contrasts with SSH Patator (Figure 5b), where
the 0th, the 3rd, the 13th and the 15th packet are always
chosen, since they appear to be especially indicative of an
attack. Also, the flows seem to contain no useful information
between the 3rd and the 13th packet, so that this part is always
skipped altogether. Slowloris (Figure 5c) is more similar to
what we saw for benign traffic: The sampling strategy varies
a lot for different flows and not always the same pattern
is used. When looking at all flows (Figure 5d) it becomes
apparent that the second packet (index 1) is almost never
chosen, and the third is also chosen quite rarely. We attribute
this to the fact that most communication flows are TCP and use
handshakes, meaning that the second packet is simply a reply
a part of the handshake, revealing no important information. In
general, we see that the sampling strategy varies significantly
between different attack types and for some attack types even
for different flows within the same attack type, showing that
SparseIDS learns to choose the packets effectively, which
reveal the malicious nature of a flow.
One concern could be the overly deterministic nature of the
decisions of SparseIDS for some attack types: An adversary
could see that only certain packets of a flow are looked at
by the RL system and thus only manipulate the few packets
that the classifier looks at to generate adversarial samples with
methods like the ones studied by [2]. One potential remedy
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(c) DDoS Slowloris
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(d) All samples
Fig. 5: Inspecting the sampling strategy of SparseIDS for various attack types with continuous actions and a tradeoff of 0.1.
The blue line shows the confidence. The gray bars show how many samples had this number of packets. For example, the
gray bar in Figure 5a at position 19 with height 10000 signifies that 10000 flows of benign traffic had a length of at least
20 packets (since we say that the first packet is at position 0). The red bars represent the number of packets sampled at this
position for all flows. The first packet is always chosen for each flow by design.
for this is to also randomly sample from the distribution of the
actor during deployment like it is done during training. This
could result in slightly worse accuracy but lead to behavior
that is harder to predict for an adversary. Currently we take
the mean of the probability distribution for continuous actions
and the mode for the discrete one, resulting in deterministic
behavior.
VII. STEERING
So far, we have always trained SparseIDS with a fixed
tradeoff parameter α. Nevertheless, there is also an important
use case in which an operator wants a certain minimum
sparsity, for example 50%, to limit the necessary computation
power and thus reduce costs. We thus propose a method
that enables steering the tradeoff to achieve a certain desired
sparsity. The steering algorithm works as follows:
1) A model is trained for which the tradeoff is chosen
randomly for each flow during training from a uniform
distribution yielding values between 0 and 1. We add
a new feature to each packet that indicates the tradeoff
chosen for the respective flow so that the RL can adjust
its sampling strategy in anticipation of the tradeoff that
will determine the reward.
2) During deployment, the tradeoff is set to the maximum
that was used during training (1 in our case), which
results in maximum sparsity. The tradeoff is then contin-
uously decremented if the current sparsity is still above
the specified minimum. It is important that the tradeoff
can never fall below 0 because this is a case that has
not been encountered during training and can lead to
abnormal behavior.
Figure 6 shows the steering in action. We start with a
maximum sparsity of approx. 72.5% and try to reach 50%.
To do so, the steering system starts decreasing the tradeoff
parameter until it reaches 0. It might seem surprising that
even with a tradeoff of 0, which means that only classification
matters and sparsity has zero influence, a sparsity of 73.5%
is still achieved. We attribute this to the fact that SparseIDS
learns that some flows may contain packets that do not
contribute to determining maliciousness at all and are skipped
since they do not affect the accuracy.
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Fig. 6: Steering the tradeoff with an allowed minimum sparsity
of 50% over the test dataset. The tradeoff is initialized as
1 and continuously lowered in a streaming fashion as long
as the sparsity is higher than 50%. The procedure stops if
the minimum sparsity is reached or the tradeoff reached its
minimum of 0, which is the case here. Sparsity falls from a
high of around 72.5% to a low of 71%.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper we aimed to develop smart packet sampling
methods for the use case of IDSs to save computational power.
To this end, we proposed SparseIDS which is a framework for
packet sampling based on RL.
We showed that the RL-based approach with a tradeoff
between classification accuracy and sparsity indeed results in
higher sparsity the larger the tradeoff parameter, while poten-
tially classification performance is sacrificed. Surprisingly, we
saw that SparseIDS on average chooses very few packets per
flow: Typically ≈ 14 . Furthermore, it outperforms non-smart
sampling techniques.
Besides discrete actions for our RL system we also imple-
mented continuous ones. We showed that a naive implementa-
tion would not work as the training is too fragile in the begin-
ning and the RL system learned to maximize only one of the
rewards (sparsity) in the beginning. This was solved by adding
a penalty for jumping behind the end of the sequence which
proved effective. Comparing with discrete actions, continuous
actions seem to perform slightly better given the same training
time. Additionally it is also an advantage that for continuous
actions the neural network only needs to have two outputs
(mean and standard deviation) while for discrete ones it needs
as many outputs as there are actions. The continuous action
framework is thus more lightweight and also can learn to skip
arbitrarily many packets.
Inspecting the decisions of our RL framework showed that
the sampling strategy is clearly different for different attack
strategies and also within some attack families, indicating
that SparseIDS indeed adopts different sampling strategies for
different conversation flows.
Eventually, we implement a steering method to help achiev-
ing a certain sparsity threshold. The steering mechanism can
be used to limit the computational expenses of an operator.
In general, we think that RL-based packet sampling is
not only applicable to IDS but we are confident that other
domains of networking can benefit from similar solutions to
save computational expenses.
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